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HOWWELL DOES
THE WTO SETTLE DISPUTES?
AND '

The fo11oii)ing essay appeared in 82.1 Foreign Affairs magazine (Jai~uai~jIFehruary
zoo?) as "The \AT0

011

Trial." It is reprinted here by perii~issionof Foreign Affairs (82.1, ~i1uai?1IFehruai?~
3003). Copyrigl~t3002
bv the Cou~zcil011 Foreigil Relatioils IIIC. A t the time of origiizal publication early this year, LVorld Trade
Orga~~i.zcitioiz
(\&TO) ii~eii~ber
izatioix ere ailal))rii~gW T O ' s disi)~/tcsettlingrnacl~inen~
and plepnrirzg to
/:~roposecl1ungc by the 1VIay deadline this year. As Law Quadrangle Notes \+)asgoing to press, 1VTO off;cinls \sere esl~ectedto esteizd tlze deadline for {~l-oposals

L

ast fall, a judicial panel of the WorldTrade Organization
(WTO) issued a controversial ruling in a high-stakes corporate
tax dispute between the United States and the European Union.
Paying scant attention to the complexities of the case, the panel
authorized Brussels to implement retaliatory sanction of $4 billion
- an unprecedented sum - against Washington. Notably, around
the same time the United States and its European allies were also
making headlines with another fierce legal battle: over the authority
of the International Criminal Court to prosecute American soldiers
for alleged misdeeds committed abroad.
In the 19th century, Clausewitz famously wrote that war is
politics conducted by other means. Today, as these examples
illustrate, the same could be said for the law. Many disputes that
used to be settled by negotiations or even by force of arms now end
up before a proliferating range of international courts, tribunals,
and arbitral panels. Legal briefs are replacing diplomatic notes, and
judicial decrees are displacing political conlpromises.
Less often considered is nrhether this ascendant legalism is good
or bad for global prosperity and stability. In most cases, it turns
out, it is still too early to say.There is one exception, however:
the WTO. Nowhere else has international conflict resolution by
judges emerged more forcefully or developed more rapidly. As
in a domestic court -but unlike in most international bodies W T O dispute settlement is both compulsory and bindmg. Menlber
states have no choice but to submit t o it and must accept the consequences of the WTO's ruling.
But what, exactly, does the WTO's record reveal about how it
has used its unprecedented powers?The question is a pressing one,
for negotiators have only until a May 2003 deadline to take stock
of the dispute settlement systenl and decide whether, or how, it
needs to change. [Ed. Note: As L a w Quadrangle Notes was preparing
for publication the deadline was expected to be extended.] Will the
dramatic judicialization of international trade be reversed? So far,
trade experts have revealed deep ambivalence about the WTO's
experiment with binding adjudication, and there is little clear sense
of where the system should go from here.

At the WTO's inception in 1995, the organization's provisions
for legal dispute settlement were touted as state of the art and the
crown jewels of the W T O system. Today, however, even some
of the organization's o r i p a l architects and supporters complain
that the process has gotten out of hand. Critics accuse the WTO's
appellate tribunal of improper judicial activism, much as conservative American jurists lambasted the U.S. Supreme Court in the
1960s and 1970s. Developing countries, meanxvhile, complain
that not all states are equal in their ability to use the WTO's laws
t o advance their own interests. Litigation, they argue, draws on
different skills, resources, and even cultural attitudes than does
diplomacy, placing certain nations at a real disadvantage. An
accurate assessment of the WTO's judicial record finds that the
system has indeed reduced the role of international hplomacy,
while strengthening the rule of larv. At the same time, a number of
measures, described below, should be implemented to strengthen
the rule of law still further while also providing incentives for
resolving trade disputes tkrough negotiated solutions - a more
prudent approach when the rules are unsettled and political and
cultural differences are a large part of the problem.

ONTHE RECORD
When the W T O was established in the mid- 1990s at the end
of the Uruguay Round of global trade negotiations, the fact that
it included a new and improved hspute settlement system was
regarded as a signal achievement. Under the preceding regime, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), dispute resolution worked only if tlle countries involved voluntarily accepted
both the jurisdiction of the arbitral panel and its ultimate ruling.
Such rulings would take years to obtain, and the defending partycould block the process from moving forward.
In the W T O system, however, parties can no longer block the
process at any point. Panels must render their decisions within
established time frames, and an Appellate Body has been established
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to review the initial decisions of the arbitral panels. RulinF by dus
higher court are final and automatically binding.
The institution of the Appellate Body is the most radical aspect
of the new W T O system, and a most remarkable aspect of the
Appellate Body is the independence of the jurists who compose
it. Members of the Appellate Body do not act as advocates for the
national interests of their home countries; in fact, the judges have
displayed levels of integrity and independence that rival those found
in the best domestic court systems. As a result, disputes at the WTO
are now settled largely on the basis of the rule of law rather than
simple power politics. Each member country has equal rights within
the svstem, and each also has an equal obligation to accept the rules.
Although developing countries have not yet fully reaped the benefits
of the system, using the dispute settlement mechanism is crucial to
full participation in the WTO. Binding adjudication, moreover, has
increased the certainty that trade agreements, once negotiated, will
be adhered to and enforced.
In fact, in a majority of cases over the last seven years where the
complaining country won a W T O dispute, the losing state removed
or revised the offending trade barriers. This positive track record
may be surprising to some observers, since the cases that have
attracted the most media attention were those few, difficult instances
in \vhich the losing party was cither unable or unwilling to comply
with the ruling.
Despite this largely positive record, WTO dispute settlement
has attracted strident criticism. Some of the critiques have been illfounded and self-serving, reflecting vested interests in specific issues
o r results. Other arguments, ho\vcvcr, point to lcgitirnate ~ r o b l e m s
with the W T O system and highlight the need to refine it.

\ I.\KTYGTHE

lA.\'Tb?

The sharpcst and most pervasive critique leveled at the WTO's
Appellate Body has bccn the charge of judicial activism. Ironically,
this accusation has come from two usually antagonistic camps:
antiglobalization advocates and doctrinaire free traders. Each side
has found evidence of judicial activism in those rulings with which
it disagrces. Rut an open-mindcd look at the record shows that, in
most areas, the appellate body has acted with due respect for state

sovereignty and the lcttcr of the law
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Take, for example, the beef hormones case, a favorite target
of the antiglobalization movement. In that dispute, the Appellate
Body upheld a panel ruling against an EU [European Union] ban
on U.S. and Canadian beef injected with growth hormones.
Antiglobalization activists attacked the decision, claiming that the
ban was a response to genuine consumer anxiety and should have
been upheld. Given the scientific uncertainty that remains about
the safety of hormones, the advocates argued, the Appellate Body
should have deferred to the will of the EU's citizens.
The EU's own lawyers, however, refused to involve the WTO
rule that allows for temporary precautions (including import
bans) in situations where scientific etldence of a risk has yet to
be confirmed. Instead, the Europeans preferred to go for broke,
pushing for a permanent ban. The Appellate Body therefore had
little choice but to strike dourn Brussels' restriction, since it lacked
the scientific justification required by WTO rules. But far from
being a case of judicial activism as critics have charged, the ruling
actually reflected respect for Europe's sovereignty, emphasizing as
it did that the requirement of scientific evidence could be flexible
and admit "non-mainstream" science.
Hard-core free traders, meanwhile, have taken aim at a different
ruling, known as shrimp-turtle. In that case, Washington had
banned the import of shrimp from countries that did not mandate
the use of fishing techniques that were safe for endangered sea
turtles. The Appellate Body found that the ban could have been
justified under an environmental provision in the WTO agreement
except that in this case it had becn applied in a discriminatory
manner. The United Statcs subscqucntly made changes to address
these concerns, and the WTO tribunal approved the new measures
in a later decision.
Critics have charged that this ruling, like the beef hormones
case, was an instance of judicial activism, in part because it was
inconsistent with an older GATT decision condemning a ban on
tuna imports from countries that did not protect dolphins. Thc
critics' complaint, however, reflects a bclicf that thc WTO should
not sanction any trade measures that are meant to address environmental concerns. But the problem with this argument is that
the WTO treaty does not actually ~ r o h i b i conservation-minded
t
measures, so long as such measures are not merely a prctcxt for
protcctionism or unjustifiably discriminatory. Nor is thcre any rule

Tlzere is no rule in international law that prohibits the use of
ecorlonzic pressure on otlzer countries for environnzental ends.

in international law that prohibits the use of economic pressure on
other countries for environmental ends. In fact, the preamble to
the W T O agreement actually promotes the objective of sustainable
development. Thus, the Appellate Body's ruling was hardly radical,
as its critics have charged; noting the commitment to sustainable
development and the absence of any law banning measures such as
the one at hand, the Appellate Body simply deferred to the sovereignty of the United States.
Another issue that has attracted charges
- of judicial activism is
the Appellate Body's willingness to accept amlcus curlae briefs from
nongovernmental actors. Critics coinplain that the Appellate Body
made this decision despite the fact that it has no explicit authorization in the W T O agreement t o do so. But the W T O agreement is
also not explicit about the right of governments to provide submissions in their own cases. Clearly, the drafters of the agreement left
certain procedural matters to be resolved by the judges and their
own sense of due process.
Other critics have suggested that the decision to accept amicus
curiae briefs reflected a developed-country agenda hostile to
the interests and legal culture of tlle developing xvorld.Yet t h ~ s
argument is similarly flawed. The judges of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights - all of whom hail from developing
countries -also allow amicus curiae briefs in their courts, as do
other international trib~malsas diverse as the African I-Iurnan Rights
Comn~issionand the World Bank's Inspection Panel. It Tvas also
sometimes objected that accepting briefs from nongovernmental
actors would give thern more rights than those ofWTO member
governments that weren't party to the dispute but the Appellate
Body has recently ruled that, in addition to private persons and
groups, such states may also submit amicus briefs.

~ / ~ Q ROF
E

GOOD T1-PING

The sweeping criticisms of judicial activism leveled at
the W T O do not, therefore, nithstand scrutiny The appellate
body can, however learn a lesson from these attacks: namely, that
a measure of judicial caution is essential in all international dispute
settlement. This is true especially in contests such as the WTO,
~ v h e r erulings are auton~aticallybinding. Moreover, international
courts offer little roonl for rcdress.The rulings of domestic courts

on most matters can be corrected by a single domestic legislature.
But practically speaking, the decisions of the Appellate Body of the
W T O can be corrected only by a consensus decision of the organization's 144 members. For this and other reasons, international
law principles, which the Appellate Body is directed to folIo\v,
incorporate juhcial caution: when a treaty text is ambiguous and
the negotiating history is nonexistent or unhelpful, judges should
adopt the interpretation most deferential to state sovereignty.
Generally speaking, the Appellate Body has followed h s cautious
approach. There is one exception, however. In cases that involved
domestic trade laws such as antidumping rules, the Appellate Body
has tended to be intrusive in its interpretations of the WTO's rules,
even when the treaty is ambiguous. This tendency is especially
troubling in the antidumping contest, where judges have failed
to apply the deferential standard of review negotiated into the
Uruguay Round agreement. Free traders have not objected to most
of these rulings since they believe that the domestic nleasures in
question have often smacked of protectionism. But the fact is that
trade remedies remain legal under the W T O and can be important
safety valves that release political and economic pressures that
might other~visethreaten W T O members' basic con~mitmentto
free trade.
Part of the problem is that the Appellate Body has too often
made it difficult for domestic agencies to administer trade remedies
in an expeditious and cost-effective fashion. National decisions on
teclmical and procedural matters \\.ere not meant to be micromanaged by W T O panels. Doing so \\dl ultimately have an inequitable
effect on de~relopingcountries, \\rhich are newcomers to the use of
trade remedies, have the least experience with them, and haye the
fewest resources to respond to W T O demands. The WTO's rules
are often unclear on their face - another reason for the Appellate
Body to exercise restraint. Compiling a more comprehensive
history o f W T O negotiations u.ould therefore be a useful way to
guide the Appellate Body's approach to ambiguous treaty texts.
In addition, there are a number of other important systemic
problems in the W T O regime that need to be addressed. Careful
analysis of the past seven years suggests that seseral changes could
safeguard and even enhance the judicial character o f W T O dispute
resolution while improving and augmenting alternatives to litigation. Such alternatives are important because in every legal system,
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Tlze current rules should thus be amended to require
nzediatio~zbefola n lnatter goes to full dispute settlelnent.

whether domestic or international, there are cases that cannot be
solved simply through applying the law as it is written. The facts
may raise novel issues, or the political questions that are raised may
be too sensitive for government t o leave t o judges. In these situations, the use of judicial dispute settlement is neither constructive
nor likely t o promote a country's goals.
Although the W T O systems makes it easy to litigate a dispute
and secure a legal ruling, it unfortunately does not provide a structured way t o acheve negotiated settlements. Such an alternative is
sorely needed, and the W T O negotiations now under way provide
an ideal opportunity t o make such midcourse corrections.
The WTO's current rules require consultations before litigation,
with the objective of encouraging settlement. These consultations,
however, have all too often proven ~ e r f u n c t o r yand ineffectual.
Negoaations would become far more meaningful if the parties
were assisted by an independent, professionally trained facilitator.
Mediation already exists as a concept in the WTO, but only in the
form of ad hoc intervention by the secretariat. It does not exist as
a pre-hearing process conducted by independent experts schooled
e
The current rules should thus be
in alternative d i s ~ u t resolution.
amended t o require medation before a matter goes t o full dispute
settlement. Should the talks fail, the results of the mediation would
remain confidential and not be provided to the W T O dispute
settlement panel. Further, the panel could require a return t o
mediation at any state of the dispute, provided that this did not
lengthen the litigation.
When the panel does render decisions, its standard remedy is to
recommend that the losing country change its laws or practices. A
losing state, however, might have understandable domestic political
reasons why it is not able, for example, t o overhaul a complex
scheme of legislation in the short or medium t e r m . A distinctive
feature of the WTO's system is that if the loser fails to comply
with a ruling, an arbitral panel may award the winner the right to
retaliate through trade restrictions.
Addressing noncompliance through retaliation, however, can
be both ineffective and inequitable, Such trade restrictions may not
b e enough t o Induce powerful W T O members such as the United
States or the EU t o get into line. O n the other hand, for small
o r poorer countries, such sanctions can be unfairly devastating.
Retaliation also has the per\-erse effect of creating further distor-
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tions of trade through the re-imposition of import barriers and
thus may actually do harm to the interests of the winning party.
Consider the recent $4billion ruling against the United States; had
the EU imposed the full measure of sanctions (as it was entitled to),
it could not easily have avoided damaging its own industries, which
have extensive commercial ties m i t h the United States and may
import many of the same American products targeted for retaliation.
Alternatives to retaliation should be available in cases where
the losing part). does not comply with a panel ruling. In a recent
dispute between the EU and the United States over music copyrights, monetary payments were used to resolve the matter.
This precedent should be generalized by explicitly amending the
W T O treaty to allow the winner in a dispute to request monetary
damages or increased trade concessions from the losing party as
an alternative to retaliation. Although retaliation should remain
available as a right of last resort, the winning party should have the
flexibility to request less restrictive alternative penalties.
Meanwhile, although some developing countries, such as India
and Brazil, have the capacity to participate fully in the WTO's
dispute settlement proceedings, many others lack the resources.
The WTO's Law Advisory Center is meant to deal with this
problem, but with only a handful of lawyers, most of whom are
quite junior, it provides minimal assistance. Additional measures
should therefore be considered. One possibility would be to
implement cost rules -that is, to require that when a developed
country loses a case against one of the least-developed ones, it is
required to pay at least a portion of the winner's legal costs.
Although legal aid for poor developing countries is important,
it is not a long-term solution t o the current imbalance in power
and resources. Legal education and training in W T O law and
dispute settlement must therefore be improved within developing
i~
countries. The measures should be undertaken in ~ a r t n e r s h with
universities and aid agencies. At present, despite the plentiful
rhetoric about the need for "capacity building," meaningful support
for such efforts is still scarce. For example, the WorldTrade
Institute in Sw-itzerland, which offers an advanced degree in W T O
law and economics, may lose applicants because it is unable to
provide scholarships.

Thc WTO's arbitral system also needs to improve its transparency and due process. The rulings ofWTO judges affect the public
interest in the broadest sense, as is especially evident in cases
related to health and the environment.Yet the WTO's hearings
and submissions remain secret, an unacceptable vestige of the
old days of cloak-and-dagger diplomacy. Conducting hearings
and appeals in secret undermines the legitimacy of the WTO and
gives rise to unwarranted suspicions. Moreover, such secrecy is
unnecessary; there is no good reason why WTO hearings should
not be open to the public. Public input would also be enhanced by
reaffirming the Appellate Body's decision to permit amicus curiae
submissions.
The manner in ~vhlchthe WTO's panelists are chosen also
needs to change. At present, selection is ad hoc and often not based
on expertise in trade law. As long as that remains the norm, the
Appellate Body will continue to revise extensively the rulings of the
lower panels, all but ensuring that the Appellate Body continues to
be accused of inappropriate activism. The WTO therefore should
create a professional corps of judicial panelists, as the European
Commission has proposed. Using full-time panelists who are
experts in the law and properly compensated would enhance the
quality of their decisions and reduce the tendency of the Appellate
Body to substantially revise them. Reliance on a professional corps
of panelists also might help prevent rulings that disregard international law and WTO precedent.
Finally, though in most cases thc WTO$ panels focus on treaty
wording when interpreting the law -as they should - and read
the treaties as part of intcrnational law as a whole, certain situations still arise when WTO judges end up ruling on ambiguous
provisions. Such situations create a real risk that the resulting
decision will exceed the limited consensus that framed the original
agreement. Some WTO provisions on delicate matters, for
example, such as the rules on dumping and subsidies, represent
compromises that were heavily bargained and carefully scrutinized
by domcstic legislators. General intcrnational law permits adjudicators to examine the negotiating history of treaties when otherwise
unable to resolve ambiguities. But to propcrly intcrpret these
documents, a detailed public record of the ncgotiating process is

needed. And yet, during the last round ofWTO negotiations, such
a detailed record was not kept. This oversight must be corrected
so that future panels are not deprived of t h s important interpretive
aid.

VOT,F;~ O J ~ T :RL~.- T , EIIODET,
The WTO's seven years of judicial dispute settlement have been
a success overall, notwithstanding the objections of the system's
critics. The very range of issues that have been submitted to the
WTO's panels shows how much confidence member states now
have in the system, and the experience has taught the world a great
deal about the challenges inherent in judicializing an international
organization.
As other international forums move in a similar hrection, they
should draw a number of lessons from the WTO's experience.
First, the WTO's panels have shown that international
tribunals can indeed function independently, with judges basing
their rulings on the principled interpretation of the law, not on
national affiliation.
Second, the WTO has shown that when rulings directly affect
the interests of citizens, the legitimacy of those rulings and the
svstem as a whole depends on the transparency of the judicial
process; secrecy and insulation from ~ u b l i cinput will no longer be
tolerated.
Third, the WTO's experience shows that once created, an
effective international juhcial system based on compulsory jurisdiction is likely to be used extensively and intensively.
As the $4 billion award in the EU-U.S. tax case illustrates, the
stakes in such disputes can be very high indeed. Ensuring adequate
resources, equitable access, and the fair treatment of politically
sensitive cases is therefore essential and must be thought through
early on, ideally when the tribunal and its procedures are first being
designed. Of course, no judicial system, no matter how well run,
can avoid the inevitable messiness of politics, and no svstem \\-ill
ever replace diplomacy. Nor should it. States must avoid the temptation to go to court in situations where political or diplomatic
channels would offer a better, more equitable solution. The WTO
must therefore also figure out how to improve its mechanisms for
negotiated solutions, and not a u t ~ m a t i c a l resort
l~
to its judges.
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